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Bakke, Weber and Fullilove:
Benign Discrimination and Congressional Power
To Enforce the Fourteenth Amendmentt
ROBERT A. BOHRER*
The Supreme Court has, in the last three years, been confronted with
three separate challenges to race conscious programs intended to in-
crease representation by blacks and other minorities.1 In Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,2 the problem was admission to higher
education; in United Steelworkers v. Weber,' the challenge involved a
craft apprenticeship program; and in Fullilove v. Klutznick44 the federal-
ly imposed minority contractor requirements for public works projects
were in issue.' The Court upheld the permissibility of benign discrimina-
tion in each instance,' yet failed to provide any consistent or coherent
doctrinal basis for doing so. Bakke's plurality opinion and sharply
divergent concurring opinions make derivation of a rule or theory im-
possible. In Weber, the Court avoided the constitutional inquiry
altogether, finding an absence of the requisite state action,7 and based
its holding on a narrow and somewhat unique process of statutory con-
struction.' Finally, in Fullilove, the Court performed a remarkable turn-
about, sustaining the validity of the congressionally imposed plan, not
under the elaborate two-tier equal protection analysis which had.
previously been applied to both state and federal actions, but on the
basis of a theory of congressional enforcement power 9 that had lain dor-
mant since Katzenbach v. Morgan1°
t Copyright 1981 by Robert A. Bohrer.
* B.A. 1971, Haverford College; J.D. 1974, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1979, Harvard
University. Assistant Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. Portions of this
article were previously submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the LL.M.
degree at Harvard Law School, in May, 1979. The author is grateful to Professor Richard
Parker and Dean Albert Sacks of the Harvard Law School, who read and commented on
that earlier version of this article.
Hereinafter the use of such programs will be referred to as "benign discrimination."
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
Id at 2762.
o Although the Court in Bakke held invalid the particular program challenged, the ma-
jority clearly acknowledged the possible validity of other programs of benign discrimina-
tion. 438 U.S. at 320.
443 U.S. at 200.
443 U.S. at 219-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100 S. Ct. at 2774-75.
,0 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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This article examines the scope of Congress' power under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment." Section 5 was generally ignored by both
Congress and the Court for more than eighty years, from the Civil
Rights Cases12 until Morgan. Fullilove only suggests the possible import
of the section 5 power for the issue of benign discrimination. This article
proposes an analytical framework in which Congress' power under sec-
tion 5 of the fourteenth amendment largely determines the substantive
content of the equal protection clause as applied to benign discrimina-
tion. It also argues that the fifth amendment due process limitation on
Congress' power is necessarily different from, and more flexible than,
the equal protection limitation upon state action.1 3 This examination of
the fourteenth amendment is from a structural perspective, that is,
primarily as a redistribution of power among Congress, the Court and
the states."
THE CONFUSION BETWEEN THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTH AMEND-
MENTS' "EQUAL PROTECTION" GUARANTEES
The interpretation of the equal protection clause of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment has changed radically in the one hundred years
of its development.1 Perhaps the most significant early construction of
the clause came in Plessy v. Ferguson.'6 The plaintiffs in that case
challenged a state statute requiring separate, segregated railway car-
riages for whites and blacks. In a seven to one decision, the Supreme
Court held that the requirement of separate facilities was a reasonable
regulation in view of the "usages, customs, and traditions of the people...
and the preservation of the public peace and good order." 7 The first
Justice Harlan, in one of his most celebrated opinions, bitterly denounced
the majority opinion: "In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the
Constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit any public
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
12 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11 The concepts of equal protection and due process have been confused even within the
context of the fourteenth amendment alone. See Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979); Perry, Constitutional "Fairness" Notes on
Equal Protection and Due Process, 63 VA. L. REV. 383 (1977). Professor Karst supports the
Court's equation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments' equal protection guarantees.
Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977).
This article finds that position untenable.
1' See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
" A full account of the twists and turns which have taken place in the clause's inter-
pretation would require a separate volume, and is quite beyond the scope of this article.
Only a few of the most essential aspects of its interpretation will be addressed here. For an
especially enlightening treatment of the doctrine of equal protection, see L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-1, -57 (1978).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id at 550.
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authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoy-
ment of such rights.""8 He went on to declare that "[o]ur Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens ... all
citizens are equal before the law."'9 Despite this challenge from Harlan's
per se approach, the Court adopted a reasonableness standard for review-
ing state regulation.
Almost half a century later, the Court revised its standard for racial
classification in the Japanese war-time cases." Decided against a back-
ground of public hysteria, the cases moved well beyond the simple
reasonableness standard of Plessy, but nevertheless sustained the
racially discriminatory measures on the basis of an apparently more
rigorous "strict scrutiny" standard which required that the state have a
compelling interest which justified the regulation. The question that
arose from a comparison of Plessy and the Japanese war-time cases con-
cerned when the strict scrutiny or compelling interest standard was
necessary and when the minimal reasonableness standard was ap-
propriate. The answer evolved through a series of decisions, and was
made explicit in Shapiro v. Thompson.' The "two-tier" equal protection
test which was stated in Shapiro required the application of the strict
scrutiny test whenever a classification impinged either upon a "suspect
class" or upon a "fundamental right."'
As the two-tier test emerged as the dominant mode of equal protec-
tion analysis, it became so rigid in its application that strict scrutiny
practically insured the invalidation of a challenged classification, while
the lower rational basis level of scrutiny virtually insured that a
classification would be sustained. 4 Although there were inevitable pro-
blems in defining which classifications were suspect and which rights
were fundamental in two-tier analysis, there was little dispute about the
application of strict scrutiny to overt racial classifications. The problem
frequently encountered in race litigation was that of determining which
ostensibly neutral methods of classification, such as test results2- or zon-
ing decisions,"' were in fact racially discriminatory.
11 Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943).
2 The Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), stated that "all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Id- at 629.
See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. R.v. 1, 17
(1972).
1 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
" See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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Consensus on the application of the two-tier test began to crumble in
the face of two separate challenges. The first resulted from the increas-
ingly perceived need for an intermediate standard of review for a
variety of nonracial classifications.27 The second was the recent phenom-
enon of benign discrimination in favor of racial minorities who had tradi-
tionally been the victims of discrimination."0 As a verbal formulation,
the two-tier test required that all racial classifications be treated equal-
ly, that is, subjected to strict scrutiny. This was the approach of Justice
Douglas in DeFunis v. Odegaard;' he argued against all racial classifica-
tions, whether benign or invidious. By the time Bakke was decided,
however, the only Justice reaching the fourteenth amendment issue
who was willing to assess benign discrimination by the compelling state
interest standard was Justice Powell, who nevertheless found such an
interest in the context of higher education."
While the Court was bridging the gap between the "separate but
equal" doctrine of Plessy and the two-tier model of Shapiro, it was also
expanding the due process requirements of the fifth amendment to in-
clude an equal protection component. This expansion began in Bolling v.
Sharpe." In Bolling, a companion case to Brown v. Board of Education,32
a unanimous Court struck down the requirement of segregated schools
in the District of Columbia. Recognizing that the fourteenth amendment
could not serve as a limitation upon the federal government, Chief
Justice Warren outlined the relationships of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments:
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Colum-
bia, does not contain an equal protection clause, as does the Four-
teenth Amendment which applies only to the States. But the concepts
of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal
protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited un-
fairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply
that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court
has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process.3
Despite the cautious approach to due process analysis called for by
See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-25.
See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (University of Washington Law
School admissions policy challenged as disproportionately favoring minority applicants).
Id. at 320-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
438 U.S. at 291, 314 (Powell, J.) (found interest of diversity in student body compelling
in context of university admissions program; nevertheless, rejected program for seeking to
achieve diversity by using explicit racial classifications).
31 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
347 U.S. at 499.
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Chief Justice Warren, fifteen years later in Shapiro v. Thompson' the
majority of the Court failed to recognize any significant distinction be-
tween limitations on Congress and limitations on state action. Shapiro
concerned the imposition of residency requirements for welfare eligibili-
ty in the states and in the District of Columbia, requirements which had
allegedly been authorized by Congress in section 402(b) of the Social
Security Act.' Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, ruled: first,
that the state residency requirements impinged upon the fundamental
right to travel and were not supported by a compelling state interest;38
second, that "Congress may not authorize the States to violate the
Equal Protection Clause";37 and third, that the District of Columbia's
residency requirement was a "discrimination ... so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process."' Although Justice Brennan noted the Boll-
ing distinction between due process and equal protection, he eliminated
its significance. Chief Justice Warren, in dissent, sharply attacked the
majority for departing from the reasoning of Bolling.39 He concluded
that Congress' plenary power to regulate commerce was sufficient to
permit its regulation of interstate travel, as long as it did not create
wholly arbitrary classifications or racial discrimination.
If, in Shapiro, the distinction between equal protection and due pro-
cess was strained beyond recognition, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld4' it
was dumped overboard in a flourish of questionable dicta. In a footnote,
Justice Brennan announced: "This Court's approach to Fifth Amend-
ment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."42 While
Justice Brennan may have been correct in summarizing the trend
toward the obliteration of the distinction, his presentation of it as a fait
accompli was hardly justifiable. He suggested no basis for this presum-
ed identity between the two concepts, nor could he. Even the most
rudimentary analysis of the history, language or purpose of the two
amendments reveals fundamental differences.
Historically, the framers of the fourteenth amendment can hardly be
said to have believed that the fifth amendment due process limitation
upon Congress was a sufficient prohibition against racial
discrimination. 3 Their perception of a distinction is the only plausible
34 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
- 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1976).
394 U.S. at 638.
37 Id. at 641.
u Id. at 642 (quoting Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964)).
" 394 U.S. at 652-53 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
4I at 653-54 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
41 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
" Id. at 638 n.2.
13 See L. TRIE, supra note 15, § 7-2, at 417. For excellent general sources on the history
of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, see C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND R-
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explanation for having included both due process and equal protection
clauses in the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, any interpretation of
the two concepts as identical renders one portion of the fourteenth
amendment superfluous. Finally, there is Chief Justice Warren's denun-
ciation of the majority in Shapiro for misreading his opinion in Bolling
and treating due process and equal protection as the same." Justice
Warren's Bolling opinion correctly stated that the fifth amendment in-
quiry is whether a discrimination is "so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process. 45
This inquiry is the ultimate safeguard against arbitrary congressional
action. It is not the elaborate safeguard provided by the fourteenth
amendment against state action, but neither is it an empty promise, as
Bolling illustrates. Since this analysis provides a more flexible standard
than that used in reviewing state action, Congress may, theoretically,
create classifications or otherwise act in ways foreclosed to the states.
From this perspective, section 1 of the fourteenth amendment may sub-
ject the states to a strict color-blind standard, as Justice Douglas and
the senior Justice Harlan argued,4 while Congress may be able to re-
quire remedial race consciousness. Such congressional actions would be
subject only to the flexible standard of judicial review utilized in
M'Culloch v. Maryland47 and the due process standard of the fifth
amendment. 4' Thus, the controlling principles when Congress exercises
its express power to enforce equal protection under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment are the M'Culloch standard of judicial review
and the fifth amendment.
-The separation of the fifth amendment due process guarantee from
the fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantee is a necessary
first step in any analysis of Congress' power under section 5. An effort
to strike a balance between section 1 and section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, which is itself a balance between judicial and legislative
power, requires a review of the history of the fourteenth amendment's
adoption and its development by the Court, as well as of the social and
UNION 1270-1389 (1971); H. FLACK, ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908);
Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1954).
For a thorough, scholarly history of the fourteenth amendment that reaches conclusions
contrary to those reached here, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). Mr. Berger concludes that Congress' section
5 power to enforce section 1 derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id at 229. Professor
Perry discusses and rejects Berger's conclusions as well as presenting an extraordinarily
insightful definition of the "core" of equal protection. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:
A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1023-28, 1069 (1979).
" 394 U.S. at 652-53 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
45 347 U.S. at 499.
'5 See text accompanying notes 18-19 & 29 supra.
" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
,8 See text accompanying notes 169-73 infra.
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political consequences inherent in assigning the issue of benign
discrimination to Congress rather than to an a priori resolution by the
Court.
The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
While it is true that the ultimate validity of any method of constitu-
tional interpretation is not derived solely from the framers' intent, it is,
nevertheless, appropriate in this instance to begin with the cir-
cumstances surrounding the enactment of the fourteenth amendment.
The reason for doing so is not because such an examination will be con-
clusive, but rather because the fundamental issues raised by an expan-
sive view of Congress' power under section 5 are not new, having roots
that extend back to the turmoil of the reconstruction era. The four-
teenth amendment was a cornerstone of the radical program of recon-
struction. 9
Although ostensibly a product of the Committee of Fifteen, 0 the
amendment was actually the creation of Representative Bingham of
Ohio." Bingham, though wholly sympathetic to the Radical Republican
program, had voted against the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 because he
believed that it was unconstitutional and was not supported by the thir-
teenth amendment. Accordingly, he sought a further amendment to
validate the Civil Rights Bill.52 Although the other Radicals expressed
their belief in the constitutionality of the 1866 Act, they sought to pro-
tect the Act's provisions against subsequent legislative repeal.' The
Committee debated a number of proposals for the amendment, and for
some time Bingham was unsuccessful in persuading it to recommend his
measure over other proposals. Only after several defeats was he finally
successful in gaining approval of his proposed fourteenth amendment in
a form which was almost identical to its final wording."
One essential feature of Bingham's plan, and its key divergence from
the other numerous proposals considered by the Committee, was his ex-
press grant of an enforcement power to Congress.5 5 Indeed, Bingham's
earliest draft consisted of a single sentence which declared:
, See H. FLACK, supra note 43, at 55-139.
The Committee of Fifteen was the joint House-Senate committee specially entrusted
with the duty of developing and proposing a plan of reconstruction. See C. FAiRMAN, supra
note 43, at 1274-75; H. FLACK, supra note 43, at 79.
51 See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 43, at 1274-75; H. FLACK, supra note 43, at 79.
12 H. FLACK, supra note 43, at 30-32.
53 Id at 65.
The only significant change was the addition of the citizenship definition in section 1.
See C. FAERMAN, supra note 43, at 1270-81; H. FLACK, supra note 43, at 55-68.
11 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 43, at 1280.
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The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property.1
Bingham's focus was clearly on the expansion of Congress' power to
regulate the assimilation of the freedmen into society and to invalidate
the "Black codes" which had been adopted in the South to isolate and
suppress the former slaves. In addition, Bingham sought to provide a
constitutional basis for protecting fundamental rights against state in-
fringement.5
Opponents of Bingham's measure were quick to perceive it as opening
the door to a fundamental alteration of the relationship between the
federal government and the states. 8 Although other aspects of the
amendment were debated and questioned,59 it is clear that, from its con-
ception, a central issue in the adoption and interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment was the scope of the powers it granted to Congress
and the impact of those powers on the federalist system.
An exhaustive study of the framers' intent for the scope of section 5
is unnecessary here. What is important is that extraordinarily broad in-
terpretations of Congress' section 5 power were articulated by the bill's
proponents"0 and opponents,"' as well as scholarly commentators.2
Senator Howard of Michigan, who introduced the amendment in the
Senate, termed it "a direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress
to carry out all the principles of all these guarantees [the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States], a power not found in the
Constitution."6 Howard's interpretation of the section was not chal-
lenged; rather, the minority Democrats questioned the wisdom of the
provision in permitting "that Congress might invade the jurisdiction of
W CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1054 (1865).
57 H. FLACK, supra note 43, at 59, 92, 96. This purpose is, of course, central to the con-
troversy over whether the fourteenth amendment wholly or selectively incorporates the
Bill of Rights. That question is not relevant to this article and has been treated exhaustive-
ly elsewhere. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (arguing against
total incorporation).
For example, Representative Hale of New York stated: "I submit that it is in effect a
provision under which all State legislation, in its code of civil and criminal jurisprudence
and procedure, affecting the individual citizen, may be overridden, may be repealed or
abolished, and the law of Congress established instead." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1063 (1866). See notes 194-218 & accompanying text infra.
5' One such debate concerned whether civil rights included political rights. See H.
FLACK, supra note 43, at 79.
See id. at 138.
" See id. at 136-37.
See id. at 138-39.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
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the States, rob them of their reserved rights, and crown the Federal
Government with absolute and despotic power.""
Congress did not wait long before exercising its power under section
5. The 41st Congress passed the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870,65
which prohibited, inter alia, private conspiracies to prevent any citizen
from exercising "any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States."" The Enforcement Act also
re-enacted the Civil Rights Bill of 1866. During the next term, the 42d
Congress passed a further enforcement act providing civil and criminal
liability for depriving any person of the rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution.17 Here the debates very clearly centered on
whether or not the fourteenth amendment supported such an intrusion
by the federal government into areas formerly the province of the
states. 8 Finally, of course, the 43d Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1875.9
Throughout the period immediately following the enactment of the
fourteenth amendment, then, the debate over the scope of Congress'
power under it continued, with those favoring an expansive view in the
majority. Led by many former members of the Committee of Fifteen
and the chief proponents of the amendment itself, Congress repeatedly
adopted a very broad view of its own powers. The legislation passed in
those years was affirmative in nature, was not predicated on state ac-
tion and extended into areas which had been controlled by the states
prior to Reconstruction. Although, as always, the Supreme Court was
called upon for the last word,70 the early congressional history of the
fourteenth amendment establishes that from the outset it was seen as
holding out the possibility of an unprecedented role for the federal
government in protecting civil rights and privileges from both state and
private infringement.
Section 5 Before the Court
The scope of Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment was considered at length by the Supreme Court in the
years immediately following the amendment's enactment. The first
major decision in which it was construed was the Slaughter-House
Id at 2940 (remarks of Sen. Hendricks of Indiana).
Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
Id § 6, 16 Stat. 141.
An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and for other Purposes, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
H. FLACK, supra note 43, at 246-49.
69 Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (repealed 1948).
See notes 81-90 & accompanying text infra.
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Cases.71 The issue before the Court was the constitutionality of a Loui-
siana statute which granted a monopoly franchise in the operation of
slaughter-house facilities, a statute which the petitioners alleged abridged
their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States, denied
them equal protection and deprived them of property without due pro-
cess.7
2
Justice Miller, writing for the Court, had little difficulty in dismissing
all of the petitioners' claims. The privileges and immunities protected
by the fourteenth amendment, he wrote, were those fundamental rights
of national citizenship which were derived from the "Federal govern-
ment, its national character, its Constitution, or its laws. '7 3 Clearly,
Justice Miller concluded, the right to engage in a particular trade derived
from state citizenship, and was, therefore, under state control.74 Fur-
thermore, he declared, the commandment of equal protection applied to
racial, not commercial, classifications, and the regulation of trade could
not be considered a deprivation of property. 75
Although the issue of Congress' power was not before the Court, the
fears expressed by those who had opposed the amendment were
repeated by Justice Miller in an extended discussion in dicta. In reason-
ing that the privileges and immunities protected by the fourteenth
amendment were those of a national character and that those tradi-
tionally within the dominion of the states were unaffected, Justice
Miller relied heavily on what he foresaw as the disastrous consequence
of a contrary interpretation:
For not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress
whenever in its discretion any of them are supposed to be abridged
by State legislation, but that body may also pass laws in advance,
limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the
States, in their most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment
it may think proper on all such subjects.... [T]hese consequences are
so serious, so far reaching and pervading, so great a departure from
the structure and spirit of our institutions [that] the effect is to fetter
and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the control
of Congress .... [I]t radically changes the whole theory of the rela-
tions of the State and Federal governments . . .7
This extended defense of federalism is noteworthy for its virtual
assumption of an expansive view of section 5; Justice Miller hoped to
avoid the consequences of section 5 by limiting the import of section 1.
In limiting the import of the privileges and immunities clause of section
' 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
72 Id. at 66.
Id- at 79 (emphasis added).
Id at 80.
Id at 81.
7 Id, at 78.
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1, his express fear was the power of Congress under section 5 to enforce
a more broadly construed section 1.
Six years after the Slaughter-House Cases, legislation based on sec-
tion 5 required the Court to construe that section specifically for the
first time in Ex Parte Virginia."' At issue was the constitutionality of a
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which provided criminal penalties
for excluding from, or failing to summon for, jury duty any citizen on ac-
count of the citizen's race, color or previous condition of servitudes.7 The
Court, in upholding the statute, dwelt at some length upon the general
nature and purpose of the Reconstruction amendments and the congres-
sional enforcement power:
They were intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the
power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress....
[The right to an impartial jury trial and immunity from discrimination
in jury selection] as the fifth section of the amendment expressly or-
dains may be enforced by Congress by means of appropriate legisla-
tion.
All of the Amendments derive much of their force from this latter
provision. It is not said the judicial power of the general government
shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions.... It is the power of Con-
gress which has been enlarged .... 9
The Court concluded that, in view of this expansion of its power, Con-
gress could pass "[w]hatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted
to carry out the objectives the amendments have in view."8
The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of section 1 in the
Slaughter-House Cases and its broad interpretation of section 5 in Ex
Parte Virginia created an obvious tension which the Court was soon
forced to resolve. In the Civil Rights Cases,' the issue was how far Con-
gress could go in exercising the mandate granted by Ex Parte Virginia;
that controversy required the Court, again, to review the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, the capstone on the Reconstruction. At issue in the Civil
Rights Cases was the constitutionality of the first two sections of the
Act which, taken together, provided penalties for any person who
denied accommodations in inns, theaters and the like to any other per-
son "except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and
color." 2 The Court proceeded directly to the issue of whether the four-
teenth amendment authorized Congress to enact such provisions.
Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, succeeded in narrowing the im-
100 U.S. 339 (1879).
,C Oh. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336 (1875) (repealed 1948).
100 U.S. at 345.
Id at 345-46.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
', Id. at 9.
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port of section 5 by limiting its application to cases involving the state
action which he found to be necessary under section 1." In other words,
while Ex Parte Virginia conceded to Congress a plenary power to pro-
mote the objectives of the amendment, Justice Bradley found those ob-
jectives were limited to the protection of citizens against state action.
An act of Congress which was not predicated upon some state action,
either actual or threatened, Justice Bradley reasoned, could not be sus-
tained. 4 Thus the Court succeeded in curtailing the threat to federalism
which some had perceived in the fourteenth amendment since its incep-
tion. Section 5 could not support legislation aimed directly at individual,
private conduct; that conduct was left to state, not federal, control."
The implication of reading a state action requirement into section 1,
and also, therefore, into section 5, was vigorously disputed by the first
Justice Harlan in dissent.8 In an opinion which is remarkably prescient
in its analysis, foreshadowing views adopted eighty years later, Justice
Harlan focused on the uniqueness of the grant of enforcement power in
the constitutional scheme: "The Fourteenth Amendment presents the
first instance in our history of the investiture of Congress with affir-
mative power, by legislation, to enforce an express prohibition upon the
states."8 Furthermore, Harlan reasoned, absent section 5, the courts
would clearly have had sufficient authority to strike down state actions
which contravened the prohibitions of section 1.88 He concluded that if
section 5 were to be accorded its necessary meaning, it must permit
Congress to do more, to enact legislation of a primary, direct character
which would protect the former slaves from discrimination.89
The Civil Rights Cases seemed to foreclose any extensive role for
Congress in the area of civil rights, leaving it, instead, in the position of
a mere auxiliary police force against discriminatory state action.
However, Justice Harlan's section 5 dissent would ultimately be vin-
dicated in the same way as would his better-known Plessy v. Ferguson
dissent. The Civil Rights Cases, like Plessy, were not overruled direct-
ly but, after an even longer hiatus, the narrow reading of section 5 was
quietly abandoned.
" Id. at 11.
84 Id
Justice Bradley noted that the fourteenth amendment did "not invest Congress with
powers to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; ... [or]
authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights."
Id This diatribe of Justice Bradley exactly echoed the fears of the fourteenth amendment's
congressional opponents, see note 58 supra and foreshadowed the critics of the decision in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), see text accompanying notes 120-29.
109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id at 45 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1I at 46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 50-51 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The Voting Rights Cases91
The Voting Rights Act of 196592 produced a flurry of litigation which
brought Congress' power to enforce the Reconstruction amendments
before the Court for the first time in almost a century. A series of opin-
ions issued in the fall term of 1965 resulted in a clear victory for an ex-
pansive interpretation of section 5. Ex Parte Virginia3 was thoroughly
vindicated and the continuing validity of the Civil Rights Cases was
greatly undermined. Although the decisions in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,94 United States v. Guest95 and Katzenbach v. Morgan" all
provoked controversy and left some doubt as to their precise scope,"
the tide had clearly turned; the Court conceded Congress a role in the
enforcement of civil rights much greater than that of simply standing
guard against clearly prohibited state statutes.
The first challenge to the Voting Rights Act came in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach. The contested provisions, which essentially were founded
,1 There are numerous scholarly treatments of the voting rights cases. For represen-
tative examples of the major categories of response to the cases, see Bickel, The Voting
Rights Cases, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 79; Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process
and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Cox, Foreword- Constitutional Adjudica-
tion and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966); Cox, The Role of Con-
gress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 226-39 (1971); Nichol, An
Examination of Congressional Powers Under § 5 of the 14th Amendment, 52 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 175 (1976); Comment, Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement and Congressional Power
to Abolish the States, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 293 (1967).
Of the above commentaries, Professor Cox's foreword is perhaps the most comprehen-
sive and authoritative review. Professor Cohen puts forward the most interesting sug-
gested analysis of the doctrine in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), that the ap-
propriate question is federalism. Cohen, supra, at 618-19. Cohen thus posits that Congress
can enact any standard on the federal level which would be legitimate on the state level,
limited only by such specific constitutional restrictions as the Bill of Rights. Id. Cohen re-
jects the jurisdictional approach taken by this article on the ground that the "margin," as
Cohen labels it, or "penumbra," as this article labels it, may be difficult to define in some
cases. Id. While the penumbra may be difficult to define, it is, on the whole, doctrinally less
troublesome than Cohen's approach. While Cohen provides a very clear answer to the ques-
tion of the scope of Congress' power, he provides no answer at all to the more pressing prob-
lem of equal protection standards in general. To conclude, as Professor Cohen does, that
Congress may draw whatever line a state might, begs the question of what lines the state
might draw. Furthermore, this line of reasoning ignores what the fourteenth amendment on
its face implies: that Congress may draw some lines that the state may not, as is developed
more fully below. See notes 240-44 & accompanying text infra.
" Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p
(1976)).
'3 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
" 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
's 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
' 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
" See Bickel, supra note 91; Cohen, supra note 91; Cox, Foreword.- Constitutional Ad-
judication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91 (1966); Cox, The Role
of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 226-39 (1971); Nichol,
supra note 91; Comment, supra note 91.
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on section 2 of the fifteenth amendment,98 rather than section 5 of the
fourteenth, set up a comprehensive program for preventing discrimina-
tion in voter qualification procedures. Section 4(a)99 prohibited the use of
voting tests or devices unless approved by the district court in any
state in which, under section 4(b),"' such tests had previously been main-
tained and less than fifty percent of the persons of voting age were
registered or had voted in the 1964 presidential election. South Carolina
challenged the Act as an invasion of the state's inherent power to deter-
mine voter qualifications and election procedures.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for a nearly unanimous court, relied
upon the broad, flexible standard of M'Culloch v. Maryland... and the
equally open language of Ex Parte Virginia"2 to uphold the challenged
provisions, and rejected the argument that "Congress may appropriate-
ly do no more than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in
general terms-that the task of fashioning specific remedies or of apply-
ing them to particular localities must necessarily be left entirely to the
Courts."'0 3 Instead, the Chief Justice, quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 4 con-
cluded that the power was complete, plenary and limited only by such
proscriptions as are found in the Constitution. 5
Justice Black, dissenting in part,' objected to that portion of the Act
which required states within the limitation of sections 4(a) and 4(b) to
seek the Attorney General's approval before changing their voting pro-
cedures."7 Justice Black's dissent is noteworthy because it illustrates
how far the other eight members of the Court were willing to go in re-
jecting the rationale underlying the Slaughter-House Cases and the
Civil Rights Cases. Justice Black saw this particular provision as a
dangerous departure from the basic republican, federal system
established by the Constitution.' While otherwise conceding the con-
stitutionality of the act under the M'Culloch test, he felt that this pro-
cedure which compelled states to seek federal approval before acting to
regulate their internal affairs ran afoul of another provision of
M'Culloch which requires that the means adopted by Congress be other-
wise consistent "with the letter and spirit of the Constitution."'0 9 Justice
11 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438 (1965) (statement of
purpose).
Id. § 4(a), 79 Stat. 439 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1976)).
Id. § 4(b), 79 Stat. 439 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976)).
o 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), cited at 383 U.S. at 326.
1'2 100 U.S. 339 (1879), cited at 383 U.S. at 327.
"0 383 U.S. at 327.
'o' 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
105 383 U.S. at 327.
"o 383 U.S. at 355 (Black, J., dissenting in part).
I2 .I at 356-57 (Black, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 358-60 (Black, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 358 (Black, J., dissenting in part) (quoting M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 421) (emphasis omitted).
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Black's concern is strikingly reminiscent of the reasoning of Justices
Miller and Bradley in the Slaughter-House and Civil Rights Cases."'
That Justice Black was alone in voicing this concern cleared the way for
the more sweeping changes announced that same term in Guest and
Morgan.
In United States v. Guest,11 the statute in question was not the
Voting Rights Act, but rather was a statute which provided criminal
penalties for conspiracies to injure or oppress "any citizen in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or Laws of the United States."'' A five count indictment
alleged a conspiracy by private citizens to interfere with various rights
of blacks, including the right to equal access to public facilities and the
right to travel interstate."' The Court held that both were rights
secured by the Constitution and were properly within the scope of the
statute, and that therefore the indictment could stand."'
For the purposes of this article, the concurring opinions of Justices
Clark'1'5 and Brennan"' are far more important than the opinion of the
Court. Both concurrences addressed the section 5 question which
underlies the interpretation of the statute, and which the opinion of the
Court skirted. Justice Clark's opinion flatly declared: "[T]here now can
be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to
enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-
that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.""117 Justice Brennan's
opinion was even stronger, expressly rejecting the Civil Rights Cases'
interpretation of Congress' section 5 power as limited to legislation to
correct prohibited state action: "I do not accept-and a majority of the
Court today rejects-this interpretation of § 5."' '
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and United States v. Guest indicated
that the Court had moved toward an interpretation of Congress' section
5 power far broader than any the post-Civil War Court would have been
"' Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 360 (Black, J., dissenting in part)
("A federal law which assumes the power to compel the States to submit in advance any
proposed legislation they have for approval by federal agents approaches dangerously near
to wiping the States out as useful and effective units in the government of our country."),
with The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873) ("Was it the purpose of the
fourteenth amendment.., to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights...
from the States to the Federal government?"), and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11
(1883) (the fourteenth amendment "does not invest Congress with powers to legislate upon
subjects which are within the domain of State legislation").
" 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976).
383 U.S. at 747 n.1.
Id at 760.
Id. at 761-62 (Clark, J., concurring).
Id at 774-86 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting in part).
"' Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring).
' Id. at 783 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting in part).
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willing to concede. The real test, however, was the challenge to section
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act" 9 brought in Katzenbach v. Morgan."0 Sec-
tion 4(e), unlike the provisions of the Act examined in South Carolina,
was expressly grounded on the fourteenth, rather than the fifteenth,
amendment. The section provided that no person who had completed
sixth grade in a Puerto Rican ("American-flag") school could be denied
the right to vote because of illiteracy in English.12" ' Registered voters of
New York, where such literacy was required, challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Act. The Court, with Justices Harlan and Stewart
dissenting, held that the provision was "a proper exercise of the powers
granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.""
Several aspects of Justice Brennan's majority opinion are note-
worthy. First, he relied on the broad language of Ex Parte Virginia for
the proposition that it was the power of Congress which had been ex-
panded," and he stressed that the appropriate standard of review for
Congress' actions under section 5 is the broad standard of M'Culloch."'
More importantly, Justice Brennan stated that the congressional deter-
mination as to the propriety of the literacy test took precedence over
previous independent applications of the equal protection clause by the
Court.1" Thus, for the first time, the Court not only espoused a broad
view of Congress' section 5 power, but also indicated that actions of
Congress under section 5 are entitled to deference and, in appropriate
cases, could go beyond what the Court might require in its own applica-
tion of section 1.
Justice Brennan was certainly aware of the extraordinary import of
the position, if only because his departure from traditional concepts was
addressed by Justice Harlan's dissent."' Justice Brennan responded to
Justice Harlan's dissent in a footnote which became the source of con-
siderable controversy, asserting that Congress could not dilute the
equal protection decisions of the Court: "Congress' power under § 5 is
... Pub. L. No. 89-110, tit. I, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 439 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(e) (1976)).
121 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
121 Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e)(1), 79 Stat. 439 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 1973b(e)(1)
(1976)).384 U.S. at 646.
Id. at 648.
1 Id at 650.
12 Without regard to whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection
Clause itself nullifies New York's English literacy requirement as so applied,
could Congress prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legislating under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment? In answering this question, our task is
limited to determining whether such legislation is, as required by § 5, ap-
propriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 649-50.
12 Id. at 659-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amend-
ment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees."'" Justice Brennan concluded his section 5 analysis by sug-
gesting that Congress had the power, traditionally exercised by the
judiciary, to weigh the considerations opposing federal intrusion against
the benefits to be gained."n
Justice Harlan, in dissent, went to the heart of the issue, charging:
[T]he Court has confused the issue of how much enforcement power
Congress possesses under § 5 with the distinct issue of what ques-
tions are appropriate for congressional determination and what ques-
tions are essentially judicial in nature.
... Congress is of course empowered by § 5 to take appropriate
remedial measures to redress and prevent the wrongs.... But it is a
judicial question whether the condition with which Congress has thus
sought to deal is in truth an infringement of the Constitution,
something that is the necessary prerequisite to bringing the § 5
power into play at all. 29
Obviously, Justice Harlan was determined to resist the majority's sub
silentio overruling of the Civil Rights Cases in Guest and Morgan. For
Justice Harlan, section 5 might be a unique element in the constitutional
scheme, but it was not a radical section in the same sense as section 1.
Morgan was a watershed in the interpretation of section 5. It ap-
parently freed Congress to legislate affirmatively in areas of traditional
state concern without regard to whether existing state action in-
dependently violated section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. It was in-
evitable that some limitations would be imposed upon Justice Brennan's
opinion. These limitations emerged several years later in Oregon v. Mit-
chell.3' Mitchell was the anti-climactic curtain call for the voting rights
cases, involving the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act."' The
amendments lowered the voting age to eighteen for both federal and
state elections,"' banned the use of literacy tests for voter qualifica-
tion" and prohibited the states from imposing any residency re-
quirements for voting in federal elections."
As a result of the breakup of the Warren Court, with Justices War-
ren, Fortas and Clark being replaced by Justices Burger, Blackmun and
Marshall, the Court in Mitchell failed to reach a majority opinion. Five
opinions were issued, with Justice Black announcing the judgment of
Id. at 651 n.10 (majority opinion).
" Id. at 653.
'2' Id. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
,,0 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
13 Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb (1976)).
132 Id. § 301, 84 Stat. 318 (amended 1975).
13 Id. § 201, 84 Stat. 315 (amended 1975).
12 Id. § 204, 84 Stat. 316 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 aa-1 (1976)).
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the Court." Four Justices would have upheld all three amendments."'
Justice Black agreed with them as to Congress' power to lower the
voting age for federal elections, but disagreed as to its power to lower
the voting age for state elections. 1 The other two amendments were
upheld nearly unanimously." The issue dividing the Court was whether
Congress had the power to set state voting age standards, thereby over-
turning state classifications unrelated to traditional fourteenth amend-
ment concerns such as race and religion in an area long within the ex-
clusive regulation of the states. Justice Black saw the attempt to lower
the voting age for state elections as running afoul of a key limitation on
Congress' section 5 power-the restraint of federalism which prevents
Congress from stripping the states of their power of self-government."9
The opinion of Justice Brennan, joined in by Justices White and Mar-
shall, is in marked contrast to Justice Black's traditional approach to
federalism. Justice Brennan saw the question of whether a legislative
classification violates equal protection as a factual one, so that "[a]
statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.""0 The factual nature of equal protection was, for Justice
Brennan, the key to Congress' section 5 power. While the Court was in-
stitutionally incompetent to substitute its own fact finding and line
drawing for that of state legislatures, Congress was clearly competent
to do so. Therefore, Congress' determination under section 5 that a
distinction between twenty and twenty-one year olds was an imper-
missible basis for voting qualifications while the distinction between
seventeen and eighteen year olds was a valid one, "vests Congress with
power to remove the discrimination by appropriate means.""'1
The opposing positions taken by Justices Black and Brennan are
especially significant for the analysis proposed here. While Justice
Black's reliance on traditional federalism is not supportable given the
radical nature of the Reconstruction amendment, Justice Brennan's
substitution of fact finding for federalism goes too far. Certainly not
every discrimination by the states is subject to Congress' section 5
power. The argument over the age for state voting rights cannot, as
Justice Brennan suggested, be compared to a racial requirement for
400 U.S. at 117-35.
" Id. at 280-81 (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part); id. at 150
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
Compare id at 119-24 with id. at 124-31 (majority opinion).
,' Id. at 117-18.
"' Id. at 128.
"I Id. at 247 (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part) (quoting Metropolitan
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935)).
"1 400 U.S. at 248 (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
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state office candidacy."' While both deal with state elections, the four-
teenth amendment was aimed, above all, at racial classifications. This
suggests that Congress is free to eliminate racial discrimination, while
age discrimination is so removed from the ambit of section 1 that it is
not susceptible to Congress' section 5 power.
It was, perhaps, the Mitchell Court's failure to reach a consensus on
the meaning of Morgan and section 5 that dispatched the Morgan theory
into ten years of relative obscurity. The problems raised by Justice
Harlan in Morgan and by Justices Black and Stewart in Mitchell remained
formidable obstacles to further section 5 analysis. Nevertheless, the rat-
chet problem' and the problem of judicial review raised by Justice
Harlan1 " are capable of resolution. Furthermore, the federalism concerns
of Justices Harlan and Black are more apparent than real.
MORGAN AND GUEST
The Ratchet Problem and Judicial Review
Justice Harlan's dissent in Morgan had two themes: Congress' power
to dilute the guarantees of section 1 and the principle of judicial
review.1 5 The former, sometimes referred to as the "ratchet problem,"' "
criticizes Justice Brennan's deference to congressional interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment as unsheathing a two-edged sword: if the
Court must defer to Congress when Congress interprets the fourteenth
amendment more expansively than the Court, why should not the Court
also defer when Congress attempts to narrow the protection of the
amendment? 7 Certainly Justice Brennan provides no basis for his
assurance that Congress may "enforce" but not "restrict, abrogate, or
dilute" the guarantees of section 1.143 Justice Harlan was correct; the
conclusion is logically inescapable that if Congress can define the
substantive scope of the amendment it can dilute the equal protection
decisions of the Court. However, partial support for Justice Brennan's
position may be drawn from a jurisprudential analysis of section 5's cen-
tral term- "enforce."
The Reconstruction amendments149 are a unique grant of "enforce-
ment" power to Congress. The separation of powers conception
112 Id. at 250-51 (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
m See text accompanying note 146 infra.
14 384 U.S. at 667-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
' Id (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1,1 See Cohen, supra note 91, at 606.
II? 384 U.S. at 667-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id at 651-52 n.10 (majority opinion).
.. U.S. CONST. amends. XII, XIV, & XV.
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dominating early constitutional thought 5" gave the enforcement power
to the executive, the legislative power to the Congress and the judicial
or interpretive power to the Court. 5 ' The Reconstruction amendments
were a radical depature from this structure. Ex Parte Virginia recogniz-
ed: "It is not said the judicial power of the General Government shall
extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and im-
munities guaranteed .... It is the power of Congress which has been
enlarged. Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by ap-
propriate legislation."' 52 Given the historical context, it is perfectly
plausible that Congress intended to grant itself unprecedented power in
the area of civil rights, rather than trusting the executive or the courts.
After all, the President had just vetoed the Civil Rights Bill" and the
Supreme Court was still recovering from the ignominy of the Dred
Scott "4 decision.
Legal scholars during that era would probably not have been par-
ticularly concerned with the meaning of the term "enforce." Although
the allocation of enforcement power to Congress was unique, the con-
cept of enforcement was perceived as quite clear. Essential to the
separation of powers was the belief that precise distinctions could be
made between the executive, legislative and judicial powers." This
belief was undoubtedly shared by those in Congress who proposed the
fourteenth amendment, and, indeed, that belief is implicit in Justice
Harlan's dissent in Morgan.'"
The idea that there is an absolute distinction between legislation, en-
forcement and interpretation contradicts fundamental principles of
twentieth-century jurisprudence." 7 Modern jurisprudence recognizes
that the act of enforcement necessarily entails interpretation, and that
interpretation may sometimes be legislative in nature. 1" This bagic
change in legal thinking is central to the disagreement between Justice
Brennan and Justice Harlan.
15O See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, §§ 2-1, -4.
"' See id. §§ 3-1 to 5-22.
100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
17 See H. FLACK, supra note 43, at 35-37.
"' Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
"' See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 1-2, at 3-7. "Thus it was largely through the preserva-
tion of boundaries between and among institutions ... that the rights of persons were to be
secured." Id. at 3.
"1 384 U.S. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117 "Enacted law may displace decisional law as a means of initial formulation of legal ar-
rangements, but not as a means of elaboration. For enactments need to be interpreted and
interpretation can scarcely be avoided at the stage of authoritative application." H. HART &
A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 140
(tent draft 1958). Accord, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 148-49 (1961); Pound, Justice
According to Law, in ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 239-40
(1963).
I" See note 157 supra.
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Congress cannot possibly "enforce" section I of the fourteenth amend-
ment without first interpreting the provisions to be enforced. Congres-
sional primacy in enforcement, granted by section 5, is necessarily
primacy in interpretation. Justice Brennan's assertion that Congress
may "enforce" but not "restrict, abrogate, or dilute" becomes, simply,
an observation that there are clear cases and hard cases, concepts which
are also central to elementary modern jurisprudence. '59 Thus when
Justice Brennan asserts that Congress could not use its section 5 power
to mandate segregated school systems because the equal protection
clause "of its own force prohibits such state laws,"'" he may be asser-
ting nothing more than the proposition that, like most laws, the equal
protection clause is easily construed when applied to some questions
and much more difficult to construe in others.
Delineation of that "core" of the fourteenth amendment which Con-
gress cannot alter will, of course, ultimately be left to the Court.
However, some of the perimeters of the core/penumbra distinction can
be deduced, and an analogy to the commerce clause"' is a helpful guide.
The commerce clause is a grant of power to Congress with no explicit
exclusion of state regulation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
always been willing to imply the negative corollary and to strike down
state statutes with substantial interstate impact, even in the absence of
congressional regulation.'"' Although merely a grant of power to Con-
gress, the clause, even absent an exercise of the power, prohibits
various state actions "of its own force."'" The similarity to the four-
teenth amendment is apparent, especially since Congress' power, once
exercised, can prohibit a greater range of state action than the Supreme
Court could bar in the absence of congressional action. Congress can, as
Justice Brennan perceived, expand the scope of the fourteenth amend-
ment's limitations on state action in the same way it can extend the
range of prohibited state action under the commerce clause.
Justice Brennan's "ratchet" assertion, that Congress can expand the
amendment's guarantees but not "restrict, abrogate, or dilute" it,'" re-
,' See, eg., Friedman, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, in ESSAYS ON JURIS-
PRUDENCE FROM THE COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 103 (1963). As Professor Friedman notes, the
distinction between core and penumbra is not a mechanically precise one but, "[t/he elucida-
tion of legal concepts by the study of 'meaning' and reference to the distinction between an
inner core and an outer penumbra can sharpen our analytical thinking; it can eliminate, or
at least reduce inconsistencies and spotlight the areas of legal uncertainty." Id Of course,
this article argues that in the present context these concepts are useful in the allocation of
authority as well.
I Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
I" See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 6-2.
l Id. § 6-2, at 320.
'" 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
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mains to be considered. Here the analogy to the commerce clause is one
of contrast, rather than congruence for, while the commerce clause con-
sists only of a grant to Congress, the fourteenth amendment contains
both a direct limitation on the states and a grant to Congress. This
direct limitation on the states has a direct force that cannot be found in
the commerce clause and which serves as a limit on Congress' power.
While Congress can exercise its regulatory power under the commerce
clause to legitimate state action that would otherwise run afoul of the
article I, section 8 implied limitation on state power, its power to "en-
force" the fourteenth amendment must further the amendment's central
mandate and not abolish it.
The first Justice Harlan, in Plessy v. Ferguson,16 and Justice
Douglas, in DeFunis v. Odegaard,160 asserted that the fourteenth amend-
ment rendered the Constitution color-blind. The limitation of section 1
of the equal protection clause on the states can be interpreted as mak-
ing color-blindness the penultimate directive. Congress cannot, in "en-
forcing" that mandate, simply direct the states to take color into ac-
count in favor of minorities, but not against them. Congress can,
however, require that specific problems created by the historic depriva-
tion of equality be redressed by specific, race-conscious programs of
reasonable dimensions related to the effects of past violations. In other
words, Congress' power to enforce section 1 is no more limited than that
approved for judicial use in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education.' Accordingly, Congress may require that state institutions
of higher education prepare affirmative action programs for submission
to, and approval by, the Department of Education, whether or not the
Court would require such plans of particular institutions. Furthermore,
Congress may restrict the benefit of such plans to blacks, regardless of
whether the Court, as in Bakke, would approve plans in which the term
"minorities" is more broadly defined.'
This is not to suggest that any congressional action adversely affect-
ing women, the poor, or other suspect or "semi-suspect" classes 169 would
necessarily be valid. Such actions would be subject to the fifth amend-
ment due process inquiry applicable to any congressional action. 70 While
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"' See 416 U.S. 312, 343-44 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
167 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Accord, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
I" The courts would, of course, be free to remedy any particular instance of traditional
discrimination on the basis of race, even if Congress had excluded that minority from a na-
tional statutory remedial plan. Fullilove also suggests that the courts retain the power to
remedy any irrational or invidious under-inclusion by Congress. See 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2781
(1980).
:16 L. TRiBE, supra note 15, § 16-29 (using the term "semi-suspect").
170 See generally id. §§ 17-1, -3 (proposing a model of "structural justice" which is, in
many ways, a prototype for the due process analysis argued for in the present case).
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such an inquiry would not incorporate the compelling state interest
standard and related accoutrements of full-scale fourteenth amendment
inquiries, 7' it need not necessarily sink to the toothless minimum ra-
tionality standard that is also a part of fourteenth amendment
analysis. In fact, such an inquiry might well represent the intermediate
standard of review which the Court has from time to time sought to ar-
ticulate."'
So if, as in Bakke, a state or state subsidiary bases its actions on
racial classifications, those actions may be challenged as violative of the
fourteenth amendment. In the absence of congressional authorization of
a "race-conscious remedy," it is the Court's duty to enforce the section 1
prohibition against state created racial classifications. When, as in
Weber, the discrimination is by private parties, the question is simply
whether Congress has prohibited such actions absent state involvement.
While one may disagree with the Court's answer to that question, this
analysis indicates that the reliance on statutory construction for the
answer was correct. Finally, when as in Fullilove, Congress has enacted
a program of benign discrimination, such an action is permitted unless
so excessive or arbitrary as to constitute a violation of due process.
The analysis proposed here concedes to Congress the power to define
equal protection more narrowly than the Court and, hypothetically, to
overrule the Court by cutting back on the import of the Court's deci-
sions. Congress' ability to narrow the scope of section 1 is, however,
hedged by a variety of limitations. First, as argued above, there is
substantial protection from arbitrary congressional action in the fifth
amendment.' 7' Second, Congress' actions must be legitimate attempts at
enforcement; thus, judicial review could properly inquire into Congress'
motive or intent if, for example, it were to attempt to prohibit busing
for school desegregation as an exercise of its section 5 power.76 Two
cases can be distinguished here. The first is a congressional attempt to
enforce the fourteenth amendment by statutorily empowering a federal
agency to take various measures to accomplish school desegregation
while prohibiting the agency from requiring busing as a part of any
school desegregation plan. Such a congressional decision would un-
doubtedly be valid and enforceable. Second, Congress may attempt to
bar the use of busing as a judicial remedy even when a court has found a
1 See i §§ 16-1, -57.
'" See Gunther, supra note 24, at 18-19.
171 See id.
' See notes 31-48 & accompanying text supra.
1 Intent, of course, is becoming a standard ingredient of the Court's analysis. While in
some recent materializations its use was inappropriate, intent is a concept the current
Court is certainly willing to tackle. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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state violation of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. This latter
case would be impermissible, even under the broad view of section 5
taken here.17
16
Although the power of Congress to enforce the mandate of section 1
against states is plenary, and reasonable congressional commands
should be enforced, this enforcement power is not grounds for an in-
dependent, direct limitation of the power of the courts.1" At the time
the fourteenth amendment was passed, M'Culloch v. Maryland 178 and
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee179 had established the Court's power to
review state laws. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides an
independent and sufficient basis for Supreme Court review of state law,
and for the plenary equitable power of the federal court to fashion
remedies." Section 5 is a grant of legislative power to Congress to en-
foree section 1 against the states. That power may be exercised if the
Court fails in its duty to enforce the amendment (which may be what the
framers feared) or in the absence of state action or judicial dereliction.
Unlike article III, it does not give Congress power to curtail the general
powers of the Court. 81
Finally, the political process is a significant safeguard against con-
gressional action narri. wing the scope of equal protection.18 Historically,
Congress has been more active in promoting equal protection than the
17 See Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1710-1758 (1976). The
constitutionality of that Act has never been tested. The anti-busing statute is discussed in
Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 656
(1977). Professor Gordon's analysis differs from the analysis presented here in stating the
primary limits of Congress' § 5 power to be its "fact finding" purpose, id. at 680, and the
concerns of federalism, id. at 684. Accordingly, Professor Gordon concludes that Congress
could dictate to the courts concerning the priority of remedies, but Congress could not
preclude the remedy of busing altogether. This author disagrees with the thesis that Con-
gress' enforcement power is limited to the use of its fact-finding mechanisms, and even
more strongly with the notion that federalism is a meaningful independent limitation on § 5.
Accordingly, the author agrees with Professor Gordon's conclusion on busing, but not with
his reasoning. Professor Gordon also explores the potential use of Congress' power in the
area of abortions, but this question is beyond the scope of this article. The issue is whether
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), rests on the fourteenth amendment or on other grounds.
If it rests on the fourteenth amendment alone, Congress may have the power to extend due
process protection to a fetus by a congressional definition of "person" to which the Court
would necessarily defer, though this author believes that would be an exercise of poor judg-
ment by Congress. See also Harris v. McRae, 100 S.Ct. 2671 (1980).
17 Contra, R. BORK, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUSING PROPOSALS 5-17 (1972).
:1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
1 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
1 8 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
" See R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969). Mr. Berger takes a quite nar-
row view of Congress' article I power to limit the Court's jurisdiction. Id. at 289-90.
Berger also quite properly notes that the fifth amendment limits Congress' power to ar-
bitrarily curtail Supreme Court jurisdiction. Id. at 283, 337.
I" See text accompanying notes 194-218 infra.
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Court. ' From the Civil Rights Act of 18751U to the Civil Rights Act of
1964,1 Congress has led the way in promoting equality. Although con-
servative congressmen who call for the curtailment of the Court's deci-
sions receive a great deal of publicity, such calls have been invariably
unsuccessful.
If the core meaning of equal protection which Congress cannot alter is
narrowly defined, the outer penumbra of the concept is correspondingly
broad. Historically, opponents of a broad construction of the section 5
power have raised the specter of congressional abolition of the states as
meaningful polities. 8 ' Despite such fears, even under the analysis pro-
posed here some areas would remain beyond the scope of federal regula-
tion. It is doubtful, for example, that state or local building codes could
be overridden by Congress on the basis of section 5. The further Con-
gress strays from intervention into state laws that classify persons on
the basis of innate characteristics, the less likely it becomes that such
action will be sustained as a section 5 "enforcement" of equal protection.
However, the real check on Congress is its own political composition,
which makes it very unlikely to ever attempt a wholesale usurpation of
state control, even assuming its action could be supported by a broad
reading of section 5.1"
Justice Harlan, expressing concern for his conception of the proper
role of judicial review, was correct in declaring that "there is room for
reasonable men to differ as to whether or not a denial of equal protec-
tion or due process has occurred, and the final decision is one of judg-
ment." He may have been equally correct in adding that, until Morgan,
"this judgment has always been one for the judiciary to resolve."18 9
However, Justice Harlan was in error in assuming that such judgment
was necessarily the sole province of the Court. This assumption denies
the revolutionary nature of the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruc-
tion amendments, and avoids the basic truth articulated in Ex Parte
Virginia.H It was the power of Congress that was enlarged by the
amendments -not that of the judiciary. Of course, this enlargement en-
I" Perhaps the outstanding exception, of course, is Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). However, even in this instance the impact on segregation of schools by Brown has
been minimal compared with the impact on hotels, restaurants and employment by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1976).
'a Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (repealed 1948).
"a 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1976).
'"See notes 108-10 & accompanying text supra.
"8 See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558-60
(1954).
,' Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"a Id (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"a 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
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tails a change in the pre-existing constitutional scheme; it is, after all,
the nature of amendments to change the Constitution.
This argument does not concede the second concern of Justice Harlan,
that, in the words of one commentator, Morgan "stood Marbury v.
Madison on its head."1 91 The issue in Marbury was whether there would
be judicial review; it has never dictated the scope or standard of that
review. Judicial review and the primacy of congressional enforcement
powers under section 5 are different aspects of the same question. Con-
gress' primacy is not a blank check. As Justice Brennan said, Congress
cannot, in the guise of enforcement, enact statutes that contravene the
plain meaning of section 1.11 It remains the Court's duty to determine if,
and when, Congress has gone beyond the permissible bounds. Thus the
analysis presented here, and suggested by Morgan, does not eliminate
judicial review; it merely places Congress' section 5 power on a level
with the other express grants of congressional power. This is no more
than the fourteenth amendment itself requires.'93
Section 5 and Federalism
The constraints of traditional federalism have been urged by op-
ponents of an expansive interpretation of the section 5 power ever since
the original debates over the amendment's enactment. 9' Justice Black's
objections to congressional determination of state voting standards in
Mitchell were much the same as the fears of Justice Miller in the
Slaughter-House Cases.'95 Their common concern was the preservation
of the traditional boundary between state and federal functions.'
The federalism argument is that if Congress can reach private con-
duct under section 5 and enact primary, affirmative legislation, then it
can, while ostensibly enforcing due process or equal protection, replace
state criminal and social legislation of every kind.' The simplest
answer to this is the classic retort Justice Holmes made to Justice Mar-
shall's famous dicta that "the power to tax involves the power to
destroy."'98 Justice Holmes simply replied: "[N]ot ... while this Court
"' Cohen, supra note 91, at 606.
19 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
See Fullilove, 100 S. Ct. at 2772.
19 See notes 55-68 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 108-10 & accompanying text supra.
19 Indeed, one discussion of the Guest and Morgan cases was entitled, somewhat
facetiously, Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement and Congressional Power to Abolish the
States. See Comment, supra note 91.
See id at 311.
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
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sits."' " M'Culloch presented a more sophisticated resolution to the pro-
blem: Congress cannot, under the pretext of exercising its powers, pass
laws to accomplish objects not entrusted to it.2" Thus, the answer to the
federalism issue is the same as the answer given to the issue of judicial
review; Congress' power is limited to the language and purposes of the
fourteenth amendment, and that limitation is enforceable by the Court.
Beyond this, the issue of federalism is more illusory than real.
Federalism is inherently an indirect, rather than direct, limitation. It is
the residuum left when express constitutional provisions have been
defined. It is expressed in the tenth amendment in this indirect, residual
manner."1 From this perspective, federalism has no place in the section
5 inquiry. The only real question is the extent to which Congress
chooses to exercise its powers, subject only to the constraint of judicial
review of possible excesses.42 In this sense, Congress itself disposes of
the federalism issue.
One can argue that the fourteenth amendment puts federalism more
directly in issue, for the amendment was initially conceived as an attack
on the federalist "states' rights" position which had produced the Dred
Scott decision"' and, ultimately, civil war. The essence of the fourteenth
amendment was a redistribution of power within the federal system, ex-
panding the power of the federal government while diminishing the
power of the states" and transferring the responsibility for the protec-
tion of civil rights from the states to Congress."5 This perspective sug-
gests that arguments for a traditional distribution of functions must
yield to the recognition (to paraphrase a clich) that it is an amendment
'" Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928); see Cox,
Forewor& Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 91, 118 (1966).
0 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422.
=" "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 5-20, at 302-03; Comment, supra note 91, at 314-15.
But cf Bickel, supra note 91, at 96-97 ("Nothing is clearer about the history of the Four-
teenth Amendment than that its framers rejected the opinion of an open-ended grant of
power to Congress to meddle with conditions within the states so as to render them equal
in accordance with its own notions."). With all due respect to Professor Bickel, who cites no
authority whatsoever for his proposition, nothing is clearer about the history of the four-
teenth amendment than that it is unclear. Certainly if its "framer" was Representative
Bingham then Professor Bickel's statement is meaningless, if not untrue. Representative
Bingham was nothing if not anti-states rightist. How open-ended he intended his grant to
be is not, in the end, nearly as important as the question of how open-ended it must be to
accomplish its purpose. See H. FLACK, supra note 43, passim.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
= See note 241 & accompanying text infra.
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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that we are expounding. The issue is not the constraints of traditional
federalism but, rather, the extent to which we choose to recognize the
fourteenth amendment as changing those constraints. Whether the
problem is the limits on congressional action or the inquiry is phrased in
terms of the impact of the fourteenth amendment on federalism, the in-
evitable corollary question is a determination of who is to decide.
Professor Bickel, in a review of the voting rights cases, rejected the
broad view of Congress' power announced in those cases and advanced
here. 0 He contended that such a broad view is historically incorrect and
violates the fundamental principle that "Congress does not define the
limits of its own powers," the Court does."7 This overlooks the fact that,
while the outer limits may, indeed, be the Court's responsibility, Con-
gress decides, within that limit, how far it will go in exercising its
power."8 Of course, Congress cannot extend its commerce power in-
definitely, but that is not a pressing constraint. 9 Just as federalism has,
for some time, been recognized as a function of congressional discretion
rather than of judicial circumscription, so must section 5. 21°
Federalism may, also, be considered as a problem of guardianship.
Professor Wechsler has argued that federal intervention in states' mat-
ters and federalism generally, are matters for congressional determina-
tion.2" That general view is particularly applicable to section 5. Pro-
fessor Freund, in a 1958 article discussing the furor surrounding the
Warren Court, 2 discusses a parable of Ludwig Wittgenstein: a wife
asked her husband to teach their young son a game. When the husband
taught the boy to play with dice, the wife protested that she did not
mean that kind of "game." Freund asks what the wife meant by "mean."
Had she considered dice, or did she mean that if she had considered dice
she would have excluded them? Freund says that for terms such as "due
process" and "equal protection," neither of these alternatives is the ap-
propriate inquiry; rather, it is as if the wife had bequeathed a fund to
trustees, to be used to teach games. to boys. If, Freund suggests, the
question of whether a given game is appropriate arises some seventy-
five years later, the answer should not be drawn from an inquiry into
whether the mother had considered that game, or what she would have
thought had she considered the game, but, rather, the answer must be
based on the presumption that she intended the trustees to decide in
Bickel, supra note 91.
Id at 96-97.
=8 L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 5-20, at 302-03; Cox, supra note 199, at 119.
L. TRIE, supra note 15, § 5-20, at 302-03.
21 Id. at 302-04.
" Wechsler, supra note 187.
210 Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court 21 MOD. L. REV. 345, 349-50 (1958).
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light of the conditions and mores then prevailing. Freund concludes that
this is the problem of equal protection: the question should be left to the
trustees, not to the "meaning" of the framers." 3
To take Professor Freund's parable one step further, in the present
case the question is not only whether the trustees must decide, but who
the "trustees" of the fourteenth amendment are. The answer section 5
provides is clear: Congress is the trustee bequeathed the enforcement
power. Congress may exceed its discretion as trustee, in which case the
Court may intervene, but the initial decision is Congress' to make. Thus
Professor Bickel, like Justice Harlan, errs in equating "interpretation"
and "federalism" with the judicial power residing in the Court. The
balance of federalism in the fourteenth amendment area is determined
by the extent to which Congress chooses to exercise its power, subject
to the same broad limitations as other express congressional powers.
That Congress may decide issues of federalism and benign discrim-
ination for itself is but half of the actual federalism question. The other
half is whether Congress should exercise its power to advance a na-
tional, rather than state-by-state, solution. Professor Cox, in a
penetrating analysis of the Supreme Court's 1965 term, discussed the
federalism implications of Morgan and Guest, acknowledging that the
principal issue was "how widely should Congress choose to extend
federal regulation." 21' In responding to that question, he pointed to the
national nature of racial problems and the national "pressure for affir-
mative government action.2. 
5
Certainly both factors weigh very strongly in favor of a national
resolution. While the University of California or the University of
Washington may play an important role in providing educational oppor-
tunities to racial minorities, the problem, and the burden of solution, is
neither uniquely California's nor Washington's. Indeed, as Justice
Douglas noted in DeFunis, the pre-minority admissions program percen-
tage of blacks at the University of Washington Law School mirrored the
state's black population percentage .21 Thus, a meaningful minority ad-
missions program at the University of Washington was more a contribu-
tion to resolving a national problem than an internal, Washington prob-
lem. Putting the University of Washington's program in a context of
federally authorized affirmative action is hardly placing undue emphasis
on the national character of the problem, or the need for a national solu-
tion.
Id. at 350.
' Cox, supra note 199, at 119; see Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Deter-
minations, 40 U. CiN. L. REV. 199, 245-47 (1971).
"Is Cox, supra note 199, at 119.
ul 416 U.S. 312, 327 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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In addition to the appropriateness of a national, congressional resolu-
tion, the benefits which could accrue from a congressional rather than a
judicial solution must be considered. Many commentators, in addition to
Professor Cox, have emphasized the desirability of legislative solutions
to fourteenth amendment problems.217 As Professor Cox noted with
respect to school desegregation, the extent of necessary affirmative ac-
tion is a "matter of degree to be judged by weighing the importance of
the goal against competing considerations."2 18
THE BENIGN DISCRIMINATION CASES
Round One: United Jewish Organizations v. Carey
After its Mitchell "disaster," the Court avoided further development
of Morgan or section 5 until Fullilove v. Klutznick.2 1 9 This abstention is
especially puzzling in light of the opportunity presented in United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey (UJO).1 ° The plaintiffs challenged a New
York state legislative redistricting plan which intentionally split the
white, Hasidic Jewish community of the Williamsburgh area of Brooklyn
in order to increase the voting percentages of nonwhites in the resulting
districts."1 The defendants responded that the plan was devised to com-
ply with the directions of the United States Attorney General, acting
pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.1
Once again, as in Mitchell, the Court was unable to unite behind a
single opinion. Although seven of the eight justices participating in the
decision agreed that the petitioner's claim should be denied, they split
over the proper grounds for that result. Justice White, joined by Justice
Stevens, would have ruled the New York plan lawful,ns as within the
reach of the Court's prior Voting Rights Act decisions in Beer v. United
States' and City of Richmond v. United States.m Justices White and
Stevens, as well as Justice Rehnquist, would also have sustained the
New York plan in the absence of the Voting Rights Act, on the grounds
that the fourteenth amendment permitted the purposeful use of race in
redistricting, provided that the plan represented no racial slur or
27 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 91; Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education:
Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 653 (1975).
21 Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. Cin. L. REV. 199,
260 (1971).
21" 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
430 U.S. 144 (1977).
M Id at 151-53.
Id. at 148-51.
m Id. at 168.
425 U.S. 130 (1976), cited at 430 U.S. at 159-60.
m. 422 U.S. 358 (1975), cited at 430 U.S. at 160-61.
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stigma and did not minimize, unfairly cancel or fence out white voting
participation or white voting strength.26 Justices Brennan and Black-
mun concurred in that portion of Justice White's opinion which rested
on the Voting Rights Act.m Justices Stewart and Powell would have
denied petitioners relief for their failure to show a discriminatory pur-
pose.' Chief Justice Burger dissented on the grounds that the Court's
decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot 9 precluded race conscious redistrict-
ing in the absence of the Voting Rights Act"0 and that the record did
not support the conclusion that the New York plan chosen was sup-
ported by the Voting Rights Act.' Chief Justice Burger concluded by
attacking the "mechanical racial gerry-mandering" of the New York
plan as inconsistent with the mandate of the Constitution. 2
Of the four separate opinions filed in UJO, only the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Brennan rested on the Voting Rights Act alone.M More-
over, this opinion was the only one to take even partial cognizance of
the implications of Morgan for the resolution of the issue raised by
UJO.14 Justices White, Stevens, Rehnquist, Stewart and Powell showed
a remarkable lack of restraint in deciding hypothetical constitutional
issues in the face of adequate statutory grounds. Even more regret-
table, however, was the failure of any member of the Court to revitalize
the section 5 analysis of Morgan in the face of the growing constitu-
tional storm over benign discrimination. Justice Brennan did devote a
paragraph of his opinion to a peripheral discussion of the importance for
UJO of a congressionally mandated remedial scheme. He noted that the
Voting Rights Act was "the product of substantial and careful delibera-
tions," designed "to secure the promise of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments" and, therefore, he found support for "the legitimacy of...
race-conscious remedial techniques.""
In failing to limit their opinions to the statutory issue, Justices White
and Stewart revealed the fracture in the Court's approach to benign
discrimination which led to the Bakke breakdown. Justice White's will-
ingness to authorize broad benign discrimination contrasted with the
more conservative limitation on state action of a discriminatory purpose
21 430 U.S. at 165.
22 Id. at 168-69 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
2' Id at 179-80 (Stewart, J., concurring) (joined by Powell, J.).
2n 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
m 430 U.S. at 181 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
ml Id. at 184 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 187 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
m M at 171 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("I am convinced that the existence of a
Voting Rights Act makes such a decision unnecessary and alone suffices to support an affir-
mance of the judgment before us.").
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Id at 176-77 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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or effect posited by Justice Stewart."' The section 5 issue, broached so
tentatively by. Justice Brennan, was simply whether or not congres-
sional authorization of race-conscious solutions to past discrimination is
valid. The answer, quite clearly, is yes. The Court has consistently sup-
ported its own power to impose race-conscious remedies for discrimina-
tion;ff under Morgan, Congress' section 5 power should be at least equal
to that of the Court.' Thus, the insistence of four Justices upon in-
dependently determining the constitutionality of the New York plan
was not only unnecessary, it violated the major premise of Mor-
gan-that where Congress has exercised its section 5 power, the
Court's independent construction of the fourteenth amendment is secon-
dary and the Court's function is limited to the broad standard of judicial
review established in M'Culloch.239
Although Morgan spoke only to the issue of Congress' power, there is
a more profound issue which underlies it. Simply granting Congress the
power to abolish the requirement of English literacy, a power also clear-
ly within the reach of the states, does not necessarily indicate that Con-
gress' power in the area of equal protection is much greater than that of
the states.24 While section 1 operates as a prohibition against various
state actions, it contains no affirmative grant of power to the states to
enforce the right to due process and equal protection. The power of the
state courts and legislatures is limited to the narrow duty to carry out
section l's prohibition of race-conscious state action and its requirement
of due process. The state legislator's constitutional duty is to refrain
from enacting laws requiring or permitting race-conscious state action.
The state court's constitutional duty is to nullify any such state law.
Race-conscious affirmative remedies -reverse or benign discrimina-
tion- are beyond the power of the state legislatures and courts, absent
an express federal congressional or judicial directive. Ex Parte Virginia
recognized that, as the power of Congress was enlarged, the power of
the states was diminished.241
Morgan went only halfway; in it, the Court recognized the power of
Congress, but did not distinguish the power of the states. In UJO,
Justices White and Stewart failed to recognize the broader implication
of section 5 and the Voting Rights Act, that Congress could enact
See id. at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring) (joined by Powell, J.).
Id. at 171 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
See 384 U.S. at 648-49; accord, Fullilove, 100 S. Ct. at 2776.
384 U.S. at 650-51 (citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 420).
24 Professor Cohen would simply stop with the inquiry as to whether Congress' act
would be permissible on the state level. See Cohen, supra note 91, at 613-19.
1 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) ("[The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments] were intended
to be, what they really are, limitations of the power of the States and enlargements of the
power of Congress.").
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remedies for racial discrimination which the states, acting alone, could
not. Thus, the problem of benign discrimination cannot be resolved
without reference to the authority for the discrimination. Section 5
gives Congress the power to remedy violations of equal protection,
while section 1 prohibits the states from acting in other than a color-
blind manner. Justice Brennan, in UJO, recognized Congress' power to
authorize race-conscious remedies for equal protection problems and to
delegate the structuring of compliance with these remedies to state of-
ficials."2 Quite properly, he declined to decide whether or not those
state officials could have acted similarly absent congressional
authority." Unfortunately, when called upon to decide that question in
Bakke,2" Justice Brennan answered it affirmatively without providing a
convincing rationale for doing so.
Rounds Two, Three and Four: Bakke, Weber and Fullilove
In DeFunis v. Odegaard,2" the Supreme Court, over the vigorous dis-
sent of Justice Douglas, 2" avoided the difficult issue of the constitu-
tionality of benign or reverse discrimination on the grounds that the
case before it was moot. 7 It was inevitable that the postponement of
the decision would be brief. 48 When the Justices agreed to hear Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke,"' the issue was squarely before
the Court. However, the Bakke decision hardly answered more ques-
tions than did DeFunis. With eight members of the Court divided into
opposing groups of four, wholly unable to agree on the applicable prin-
ciples of law, Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court,
siding with each group on some issues. Four Justices would have upheld
the voluntary use of race-conscious medical school admissions programs,
even when those programs set aside a fixed number of admissions for
racial minority group members.2" Those Justices would have ruled that
such programs violated neither the fourteenth amendment nor Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which they felt incorporated the con-
214 430 U.S. at 176 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
24 Id. at 171 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("Unlike Part IV of Mr. Justice White's
opinion, I am wholly content to leave this question until another day.").
24 438 U.S. 265, 366 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring &
dissenting in part).
2s 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
24I Id at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 319-20.
Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 378 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring & dissenting in
part).
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stitutional standard."' Four Justices held simply that Title VI pro-
hibited such race-conscious programs, and that it was, therefore, un-
necessary to reach the fourteenth amendment issue.n2 Justice Powell
cast the decisive vote, agreeing that Title VI and the equal protection
clause contained the same standard.2  He supported the general princi-
ple that race-conscious affirmative action programs do not violate the
fourteenth amendment or Title VI.- However, Justice Powell held that
in the absence of appropriate judicial, legislative or administrative find-
ings of prior discrimination the University of California's use of a fixed
number of separate minority admissions was impermissible.
Among the fundamental issues which split the Court in Bakke was
whether Congress had intended Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to apply only to those discriminations prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment, or whether Title VI was intended to ban all discrimination
in federal programs whether or not such discrimination would have
violated the equal protection clause. Five Justices held that Congress
had intended Title VI to embody the constitutional standard while four
Justices concluded, without construing the requirements of the four-
teenth amendment, that Congress had intended to adopt an independent
"color-blind" standard for Title VI. None of the Justices raised the
reciprocal issue: did Congress intend to permit discriminations which
would have been prohibited by the independent application of the four-
teenth amendment? That, of course, is the ratchet problem of Morgan
re-emerging in Bakke and Weber.
In light of the obvious failure of the two-tier equal protection analysis
to produce a coherent result in Bakke, it is not surprising that the Court
avoided the constitutional issue entirely in United Steelworkers v.
Weber." Justice Brennan, writing for the five-Justice majority, held,
first, that a private employer's apprenticeship training program, requir-
ing that fifty percent of the trainees be black, involved no state action
and, therefore, no fourteenth amendment question."7 Second, Justice
Brennan declared that because the plan in question was voluntary, the
issue was not what Title VII requires or empowers a court to require,
but rather, was whether Title VII forbids such voluntary "bona fide af-
firmative action plans that accord racial preferences."' While Justice
211 Id. at 324-28 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring & dissenting in
part).
Id. at 411-12, 418 (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting in part) (joined by Burger,
Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.).
Id. at 287.
' Id. at 320.
Id. at 301-04, 320.
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
5 Id. at 199-200.
25w Id.
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Brennan conceded that the statute on its face prohibited the considera-
tion of race in employment, he reasoned that the statutory history re-
quired the conclusion that "an interpretation ... that forebade all race-
conscious affirmative action would 'bring about an end completely at
variance with the purpose of the statute' and must be rejected.",,, Hav-
ing thus construed Title VII to permit the voluntary use of benign
discrimination, Justice Brennan had little difficulty in determining that
the challenged plan was permitted. He declined to define the line be-
tween permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans, holding
that the Kaiser-Steelworkers program was a permissible one.60 The
only criteria he noted in support of the program were its purposes, the
fact that it did "not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white
employees" and that it was to be a temporary measure. 6'
Weber answered one part of the question Bakke left open, that is,
whether Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibited
benign discrimination. While responding to that question in the
negative, the Court gave a clear, if only implicit, answer to the converse
question of whether Congress could prohibit voluntary, private affir-
mative action and mandate adherence to a color-blind standard. Only
one question remained after Weber: If Congress could allow benign
discrimination, as the Court ruled they had permissibly provided in
Title VII, or could prohibit it, as the Justices agreed they could have
done, could they require it? That question was addressed in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 62 and the response of six Justices was a clear "yes." Within
that majority, however, there were significant differences in approach.
Fullilove challenged the validity of the "minority business
enterprise," or "set-aside," provision of the Public Works Employment
Act of 1977 .2 That section required that ten percent of the federal
funds granted for local public works projects be allocated to businesses
owned and controlled by specified racial and ethnic minorities. 2" Chief
Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Powell, separately ana-
lyzed the validity of the set-aside for private contractors and for state
and local governments. 265 He upheld the set-aside as applied to private
contracting parties, concluding that its objective was within the scope of
Congress' spending and commerce powers.2 6 He then found that the
means chosen were necessary and proper for accomplishing that valid
231 Id- at 201-02 (citations omitted).
Id at 208.
-l Id
100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. H 1979).
Id
100 S. Ct. at 2772-80 (Burger, C.J.).
M' Id at 2772-73 (Burger, C.J.).
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objective."" Turning to the validity of the set-aside as a federal regula-
tion of state and local governments, the Chief Justice shifted from the
commerce power, with its federalism constraints, to section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. Citing Morgan for the proposition that the limit
of Congress' section 5 power is defined by the broadly worded
necessary and proper clause, 8 he concluded, again, that the objective of
remedying prior discrimination was within the scope of section 5.269 He
then turned to the question of whether the use of racial and ethnic
criteria in the set-aside was a valid means to that constitutionally valid
objective. Here was his most delicate task; if he applied traditional
equal protection analysis, citing Bolling v. Sharpe"0 and Washington v.
Davis,"' he would have been unable to rebut the dissent of Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist who correctly concluded that the two-tier test
required invalidating the set-aside."2 In that direction lay the chaos of
Bakke. Instead, the Chief Justice skirted the issue of the appropriate
test, emphasizing only "the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure
that any congressional program that employs racial or ethnic criteria ...
[to remedy] . . . the present effects of past discrimination is narrowly
tailored to the achievement of that goal."' 3 He then upheld the set-
aside, citing its remedial nature, prospective function, good faith waiver
provisions and administrative safeguards.
If the Chief Justice had stopped at that point, the revolutionary
ramifications of his opinion would, perhaps, have been less clear.
Instead, he chose to elaborate on his reconciliation of this exercise of
section 5 power with the constraints of equal protection, rejecting the
proposition that Congress' section 5 power must be exercised in a color-
blind fashion." In support of this conclusion, he cited the Swann doc-
trine which allows the courts to fashion race-conscious remedies,"5 and
declared that Congress' remedial power was at least as broad as the
' Id. at 2775-80 (Burger, C.J.). Chief Justice'Burger's choice of the "necessary and pro-
per" test rather than any of the "equal protection" tests is, of course, completely consistent
with the thesis of this article.
Id. at 2774 (Burger, C.J.) (citing 384 U.S. 641 (1966) as it construed U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 18).
29 100 S. Ct. at 2775 (Burger, C.J.).
210 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
21 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
1 100 S. Ct. at 2800 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (joined by Rehnquist, J.). However, the
Chief Justice appended the following unsupportable dictum: "This opinion does not adopt,
either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as [Bakke].
However, our analysis demonstrates that the MBE provision would survive judicial review
under either 'test' articulated in the several Bakke opinions:' 100 S. Ct. at 2781 (Burger,
C.J.) (citation omitted).
Id. at 2776 (Burger, C.J.).
Id at 2776-77 (Burger, C.J.).
27 Id. at 2777 (Burger, C.J.) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 18-21 (1971)).
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Court's, and probably broader!"' In that one brief sentence the Chief
Justice extended recognition of Congress' section 5 power even beyond
that previously advanced in Morgan. While Morgan conceded to Con-
gress the right to fashion remedies altering the balance of federalism
and exceeding the Court's application of equal protection, it did not in-
volve the distribution of any burden on the basis of race. Morgan had
allowed the "enforcement," using Justice Brennan's section 5's term, of
the right to vote, not the "remedying" of underinclusion in voting or in
public works contracts by quota. While Chief Justice Burger was un-
doubtedly correct in declaring Congress' remedial power to be at least
equal to that of the Court under Swann, that conclusion was truly un-
precedented.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, con-
curred on the ground that discrimination which is benign rather than
stigmatizing may be upheld by a showing of "an important and ar-
ticulated purpose for its use. ' ' 7 Thus, the concurring Justices relied on
an intermediate standard of review for benign discrimination, rather
than on the uniqueness of Congress' section 5 power. Although Justice
Marshall and those joining him were faithful to their Bakke positions,
which gave benign discrimination a favored place in equal protection
analysis, it cannot be assumed that they opposed the extension of
Morgan announced by the Chief Justice. On the contrary, Justice Bren-
nan, at least, might be expected to reiterate his earlier views in an ap-
propriate future case.
Fullilove is, at this writing, the latest word on section 5 and benign
discrimination. Together with Bakke and Weber it completes a typology
of benign discrimination programs-voluntary private programs, state
imposed programs and federally imposed programs. Under the analysis
suggested here, supported in part by Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Fullilove, each must be accorded different treatment. The result is sim-
ple. Racial classifications by a state or its agencies will continue to be
judged by the strict scrutiny, compelling state interest standard that
has evolved since Korematsu,78 whether or not the discrimination is
allegedly benign. Private benign discrimination, as in Weber, is per-
missible, unless Congress has chosen to prohibit it. Both Congress and
the Court may determine the need for remedial programs and authorize
such benign discrimination as is necessary through appropriate legisla-
tion directed at either states or private parties. Such pieces of legisla-
tion, as were involved in Fullilove, for example, are not subject to con-
ventional equal protection analysis, but can be reviewed by the
7 100 S. Ct. at 2777 (Burger, C.J.).
Id at 2795-96 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361).
' See notes 20-22 & accompanying text supra.
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M'Culloch standard appropriate for section 5 and by the fairness stan-
dard for due process set forth in Bolling v. Sharpe.29
Further Applications of Section 5
The current controversy over reverse discrimination centers on its
use in two areas: education and employment. Both areas are dealt with
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.28o Weber has, for the time being,
definitively resolved the employment issue, holding that Title VII per-
mits private employers to elect benign discrimination. In education,
however, Bakke, because it avoided a direct analysis of Congress'
power, has shed little light on the permissible uses of benign discrimina-
tion. Furthermore, education presents the problem of creating a
uniform standard for public and private educational institutions, since
both perform the same function, often in competition with one another.
Doing so rules out voluntary implementation of benign discrimination,
as in Bakke, for, as argued here, absent any federal judicial or
legislative directives, state and local governments are bound to a color-
blind application of the fourteenth amendment. The answer may lie,
then, in the interpretation and administration of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
In education, Title VI,281 which was the focus of Bakke, is more rele-
vant to the question of reverse discrimination than is Title IV, 2 which
deals with the desegregation of public education. Title IV defines
"desegregation" to exclude the assignment of students to overcome
racial imbalance .2 Thus, it is unlikely that any regulation under Title
IV could legitimately encompass reverse discrimination. However, Title
VI is, as Bakke proves, open to construction as to the meaning of
"discrimination," its central term."' In arguing that voluntary reverse
discrimination programs did not violate Title VI, Justice Brennan relied
to a great extent on two particular regulations issued pursuant to sec-
tion 602 of Title VI.O One of these regulations provides for "affirmative
action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination""6 and the other
provides for "affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions
which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race"
See notes 31-33 & accompanying text supra.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1976).
Id § 2000d.
Id § 2000c.
Id § 2000c(b).
See notes 249-55 & accompanying text supra.
438 U.S. at 341-47 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring & dissen-
ting in part).
2" 45 C.R.F. § 80.3(b)(6)(i) (1977).
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even absent "prior discrimination."' Justice Brennan found that these
regulations, especially the latter, were sufficient to support the legality
of the defendant's program in light of implicit congressional approval of
HEW's interpretations.m
Clearly, then, HEW believes that it has the authority to permit "affir-
mative action" under Title VI, and four Justices agree. All that seems to
be necessary is a conversion of the open-ended approach of HEW's cur-
rent regulations into a structured administrative program such as that
Justice Powell expressly approved in recapitulating UJO.19 If HEW has
the authority to permit voluntary affirmative action, surely it has the
authority to require that such programs meet specific criteria or be sub-
mitted to it. An exhaustive review of the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is beyond the scope of this article and, as Bakke il-
lustrates, likely to be an exercise in futility."' However, what is impor-
tant for this discussion is that HEW has the apparent authority to
authorize and regulate programs of reverse discrimination or affir-
mative action, and, given appropriately structured administrative pro-
cedures, a majority of the present Supreme Court is likely to sustain
such administrative action.
CONCLUSION
Equal protection analysis is in chaos. The Supreme Court is divided
over the appropriate application of equal protection doctrine to reverse
discrimination or to the emerging claims of such non-racial groups as
women and illegitimates. The two-tier equal protection test developed
by the Warren Court is no longer capable of resolving these problems,
while Justice Marshall's intermediate level of review remains unper-
suasive. This article has argued that Congress, not the Court, is the pro-
per forum for resolving the question of the limits of equal protection.
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, along with the second sec-
tions of the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments, is a unique delegation
of enforcement power to Congress. Since its conception, section 5 has
been viewed as the potential source of a major alteration of the relation-
ship between Congress, the Court and the states."' Although the
= See id. § 80.3(b)(6)(ii).
438 U.S. at 343-50 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring & dissen-
ting in part).
" Id at 305 ("[Ulnlike Lau and United Jewish Organizations, there has been no deter-
mination by the legislature or a-responsible administrative agency that the University
engaged in a discriminatory practice requiring remedial efforts.").
"* Weber, in demonstrating the willingness of the Court to interpret the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in a manner compatible with discrimination, underscores the potential of a statutory
approach to the Bakke problem.
"I See note 43 supra.
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Court's early decisions resulted in a narrow limitation on Congress' sec-
tion 5 power, Katzenbach v. Morgan 2 and the other cases decided in the
fall 1965 term" revitalized section 5 as a basis for congressional action
redressing racial discrimination.
The key issues confronting an expansive view of Congress' section 5
power are the so-called "ratchet" problem,' the problem of judicial
review and the constraints of federalism. The position taken here is that
the ratchet problem is best addressed in jurisprudential terms; that is,
by acknowledging that the concept of equal protection has a central, or
core significance, as well as a discretionary, or penumbral, significance.
It is in the penumbral area, beyond de jure racial discrimination against
blacks, that Congress may substantively define the application of equal
protection.
The problem of judicial review has been mischaracterized. The issue
is not really whether there shall be judicial review, but rather, what the
scope and standard of that review shall be. This article has argued that
the Court erred in evaluating Congress' section 5 enactments by the
Court's method of equal protection analysis. It has suggested, instead,
that Congress' section 5 power is subject to the same standard of
review as its other powers-the flexible standard of M'Culloch and the
requirements of fifth amendment due process. Furthermore, the iden-
tification of the fifth amendment standard with the fourteenth amend-
ment standard of equal protection is demonstrably incorrect."5 Thus
Congress is bound neither by the compelling state interest standard nor
by minimum rationality, but rather by an intermediate standard
centered on the due process concept of fundamental fairness or, in the
words of Chief Justice Burger, to remedial actions narrowly tailored to
combat the present effects of past discrimination. 6
Federalism may be the easiest issue of all to resolve. It is increasingly
accepted that Congress has the power to determine the issue of
federalism in deciding how far to exercise its powers .1 Thus, the
Court's role is limited to defining the nethermost reaches of Congress'
power. Within that limit, Congress decides the federalism question.
Weber and Fullilove implicitly support this view. The result of this
analysis is to grant to Congress the power to determine the constitu-
tionality of reverse discrimination. Congress may authorize, pursuant to
section 5, state action that would be foreclosed to the states acting
m 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966).
Cohen, supra note 91.
See notes 31-48 & accompanying text supra.
See Fullilove, 100 S. Ct. at 2777 (Burger, C.J.).
See text accompanying note 202 supra.
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alone. Section 1 may well require the states to conform to a color-blind
standard; section 5 grants Congress the power to determine what devia-
tion from that standard is appropriate.
Finally, this article has argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
vides the necessary basis for regulatory administration of benign or
reverse discrimination programs in education, despite Bakke's ambigui-
ty. HEW is empowered to promulgate regulations authorizing voluntary
programs of reverse discrimination directed against existing racial im-
balances, provided that such plans are either formally submitted to that
agency for its review and consent, or meet the criteria established by it.
The virtue of this analysis is its recognition that the difficult issues of.
discrimination and the redress thereof are far more amenable to polit-
ical determination than judicial construction. At the same time, there is
abundant historical, textual and judicial support for giving Congress a
primary role in deciding these questions. Fullilove may be the latest
word on Congress' section 5 power, but it is doubtful that it will be the
last.

